As you will have noticed Clinical Ethics now has a new publisher. All the journals previously published by the Royal Society of Medicine Press have been transferred to SAGE. SAGE is one of the largest publishers of medical journals and will be able to continue to support the development of Clinical Ethics.
There will be no changes in the focus or content of the journal. We will still strive to be the pre-eminent journal for everyone interested in clinical ethics; and we will still be publishing case studies, empirical work and theoretical analysis.
I have for a long time been interested in the methodology of clinical ethics work. What do we mean when we say that we apply a certain method to our clinical ethics deliberations? How do we decide which is the best method to apply? And, what do we actually mean when we say that one method is better than another?
There is a lot of interesting method development in clinical ethics, and many descriptions of the application of methods in the literature, but we do not seem to be much closer to consensus or agreement about what the best method might be.
Perhaps a recent book by Tom Tomlinson can help to explain why. In Methods in Medical Ethics -Critical Perspectives, Tomlinson critically surveys a range of methods ranging over application of principles (including consequentialist principles), casuistry, narrative ethics, feminist ethics, and virtue theory. He elucidates the method inherent in each of these approaches and then asks a very interesting question that I will paraphrase as, 'How far does this method get us towards a definite answer to serious moral questions, on its own?'
It is really the 'on its own' part that makes the question both interesting and distinctive, because it focuses the analysis and the mind on how much we actually get from the theory and its accompanying method, and how much we get from extraneous (and perhaps quite mysterious) factors like 'good judgement'.
What Tomlinson shows quite convincingly is, that although all of the methods he discusses have an ability to illuminate important moral features of the problematic situation, they run out as decision making tools long before we reach a definite answer. Definite answers can only be had if we draw on resources that are outside our method. This is a very important conclusion for at least two reasons. First, it ought to engender some humility in those of us who are proponents of specific methods. Our methods are probably considerably less powerful than we think they are. Second, it opens the field for a fruitful combination of methods. If it is, for instance, true that neither the application of principle nor feminist ethics can provide us with definite answers to our moral quandaries, but at the same time true that they both give us uniquely important information about the moral features of the problem, then we are likely to do better if we find some way of combining them.
In the last chapter of his book Tomlinson discusses various ways in which methods can be combined and indicates that along with straightforward combination we should perhaps also think of things like sequential application.
It would be interesting to see future empirical and theoretical work in this journal looking into whether methodological purity is (always?) preferable to methodological bricolage in the context of clinical ethics work.
